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Lost at Sea: The Continuing Decline of
The Supreme Court in Admiralty
MICHAEL SEVEL*
For the first 200 years of its history, the United States
Supreme Court served as the primary leader in the development of, and its cases the primary source of, the admiralty
and maritime law of the United States. That appears to be
changing. The Court’s admiralty cases over the last quarter
century indicate that it is slowly giving up its traditional
leading role in creating and developing rules of admiralty
law, and instead deferring to Congress to make those rules,
a trend that is tantamount to abandoning its Article III constitutional duty to serve as the country’s only national admiralty court. Some scholars believe that this trend is just as it
should be. It has been recently argued that the Court’s two
centuries of federal common lawmaking in admiralty is, and
always has been, unconstitutional, and ought to be curtailed
with few exceptions. Federal admiralty law should therefore
*
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be “normalized” and brought into conformity with the same
principles of federalism and separation of powers which
govern most other areas of federal law. This Article examines the Court’s most recent admiralty case, Lozman v. City
of Riviera Beach, Florida, and argues that it represents a
striking escalation in the Court “normalizing” federal admiralty law. The many objectionable features of Lozman,
however, form the basis of a pragmatic argument against the
Court adopting a normalization approach. In largely ignoring hundreds of years of its own cases, the Court’s reasoning
was arbitrary, unpredictable, and provides virtually no
guidance to the state and lower federal courts. Properly understood, the troubling aspects of the case justify a return to
the Court’s traditional, constitutionally prescribed role of
making rules of decision in admiralty in the manner of a
common law court.
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INTRODUCTION
For the first 200 years of its history, the United States Supreme
Court served as the primary leader in the development of, and its
cases the primary source of, the admiralty and maritime law of the
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United States. This claim is not the outcome of a creative scholarly
interpretation of its cases; nor is it wishful thinking rooted in an activist ideology. Article III of the U.S. Constitution provides that
“The judicial power shall extend. . . to all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction.”1 It is commonly acknowledged that this is
the only subject matter grant of jurisdiction in the Constitution.2
There is also broad consensus that Article III establishes a constitutional duty on the Court to make, develop, and apply the general
maritime law of the United States.3 In recognition of this duty, the
Court itself has self-identified as the primary lawmaking body in
admiralty for virtually its entire history. Because “the Judiciary has
traditionally taken the lead in formulating flexible and fair remedies
1

U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2.
See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 1 (5th
Hornbook ed. 2012) (“This grant of judicial power is the only instance where the
Constitution delegates jurisdiction over an entire subject matter to the federal judiciary.”).
3
See Madruga v. Super. Ct., 346 U.S. 556, 566 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[f]rom the admiralty clause of the Constitution, this Court has drawn
probably greater substantive law-making powers than it exercises in any other
area of the law.”); see also Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union,
451 U.S. 77, 95–96 (1981) (“We consistently have interpreted the grant of general
admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts as a proper basis for the development
of judge-made rules of maritime law.”) It is often said, correctly, that the unique
subject matter grant of jurisdiction grounds the duty of the Court to make general
admiralty law. See Steven F. Friedell, The Diverse Nature of Admiralty Jurisdiction, 43 ST. LOUIS L. J. 1389, 1391 (1999); Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: the Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67 HARV. L. REV.
1214, 1230–37 (1954). It has been objected to this view that the admiralty clause
is not a unique subject matter grant, and that other jurisdictional grants in Article
III are similarly subject matter grants. For example, it is suggested that the grant
of federal question jurisdiction equally refers to a discrete subject matter, and,
further, and that given the many and various tests of admiralty jurisdiction drawn
by the federal courts over the years, the result is that “admiralty. . . is largely a
place – not a subject.” See Ernest Young, The Last Brooding Omnipresence: Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and the Unconstitutionality of Preemptive Federal
Maritime Law, 43 ST. LOUIS L. J. 1349, 1351 n.14 (1999). This view takes an
unnecessarily capacious view of ‘subject matter.’ The clauses establishing federal
question jurisdiction— extending the judicial power to cases arising “under this
Constitution” and under “the laws of the United States” (U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2)—refer not to the subject matter, but the sources, of those laws. By contrast,
the phrase “admiralty and maritime” (Id.) refers not to a source of law, nor merely
to a place, but to a distinctive, stable, but evolving, set of activities, industries,
practices, and customary norms arising from those practices.
2

2017]

LOST AT SEA

941

in the law maritime,”4 it has always been the case that “the preponderant body of maritime law comes from this Court and not from
Congress.”5 As recently as 2008, the Court recognized that “maritime law. . . falls within a federal court’s jurisdiction to decide in the
manner of a common law court, subject to the authority of Congress
to legislate otherwise if it disagrees with the judicial result.”6 The
Supreme Court has therefore long been, and has acknowledged itself
to be, the American High Court of Admiralty, as one prominent admiralty scholar recently put it.7
That appears to be changing. The Court’s admiralty cases over
the last quarter century indicate that it is gradually giving up its traditional leading role in creating and developing rules of admiralty
law. In short, the Court is increasingly relying on Congress to take
the lead in crafting the substantive rules of admiralty law, and is
stepping in to make law only interstitially in applying federal statutes, as it has long done in many other areas of federal law. The
general maritime law of the United States—a body of general,
judge-made law developed from centuries-old transnational customary legal principles8—appears to be slowly but steadily on its way
out.9
4

McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 207 (1994) (quoting United
States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409 (1975)).
5
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 323 (1955)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S.
539, 550 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“No area of federal law is judgemade at its source to such an extent as is the law of admiralty.”); Fitzgerald v.
United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963) (“Congress has largely left to this
Court the responsibility for fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty law.”).
6
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 489–90 (2008).
7
See David W. Robertson, Our High Court of Admiralty and its Sometimes
Peculiar Relationship With Congress, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 491 (2011). See also
Hon. John R. Brown, Admiralty Judges: Flotsam on the Sea of Maritime Law?,
24 J. MAR. L. & COM. 249 (1993).
8
See James Allsop, Maritime Law: The Nature and Importance of its International Character, 84 AUST. L. J. 681, 682–87 (2010) (discussing the history of
adoption of international general maritime legal principles by U.S. federal courts
since the eighteenth century); WILLIAM TETLEY, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME AND
ADMIRALTY LAW 5–32 (Yvon Blais ed., 2002) (discussing the history of transnational general maritime legal principles from ancient times to the present).
9
The clearest beginning of the trend is Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498
U.S. 19, 36 (1990) (“We sail in occupied waters. Maritime tort law is now dominated by federal statute, and we are not free to expand remedies at will simply
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Some scholars believe that this trend is just as it should be. It has
been recently argued that the Court’s two centuries of federal common lawmaking in admiralty is, and always has been, unconstitutional, and ought to be curtailed with few exceptions. As the view’s
most articulate proponent has suggested, federal admiralty law
should accordingly undergo a process of “normalization,” whereby
it conforms to the orthodox, post-Erie10 view that there is no “general” federal law of any kind, law which can be made entirely independent of Congressional action, and which also pre-empts state law
in a manner identical to federal statute. The argument for normalization suggests that therefore the federal courts should have highly
circumscribed common lawmaking powers across all areas of federal law, including admiralty.11
I will argue that the Court’s most recent admiralty case, Lozman
v. The City of Riviera Beach, Florida,12 represents a striking escalation in a trend of normalization in admiralty law by the Supreme
Court, and therefore signals a decisive shift away from the Court
playing its constitutionally prescribed and traditional role of making
and developing federal admiralty law independently of Congress. In
because it might work to the benefit of seamen and those dependent upon them.
Congress has placed limits on recovery in survival actions that we cannot exceed.”), but one federal circuit judge has argued that the trend extends as far back
as Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978) (holding that the Death
on the High Seas Act implicitly precludes the availability of nonpecuniary damages for loss of society under the general maritime law). See also Brown, supra
note 7, at 277–78.
10
See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction do not have the power to create federal
common law).
11
Ernest A. Young, It’s Just Water: Toward the Normalization of Admiralty,
35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 469, 471 (2004):
I conclude that admiralty’s ‘special’ constitutional status cannot
be justified, and that reforming admiralty may point the way
toward salutary changes in our foreign affairs jurisprudence. In
particular, the same basic constitutional rules about preemption
and federal lawmaking that govern ordinary domestic law
should govern both these areas. Both admiralty and foreign affairs law need to be ‘normalized.’
See also infra note 171.
12
133 S. Ct. 735 (2013).

2017]

LOST AT SEA

943

Lozman, the Court faced one of the most fundamental questions of
any body of maritime law: what is a vessel?13 And despite having
nearly 150 years of its own precedent on which to rely, 14 the Court
determined that its sole task was to provide an interpretation, unconstrained by and unrelated to precedent, of the definition of the term
“vessel” as it appears in the Rules of Construction Act,15 a statute
originally enacted in 1873 but, notably, not fully embraced by the
Court until 2005 as providing the default definition of “vessel” to be
applied throughout the U.S. Code.16 As a result of this narrowly conceived judicial task in Lozman, the Court articulates a test for vessel
status, the “reasonable observer” test,17 virtually ex nihilo, bearing
no relation to any principle it has ever recognized in its over two
hundred-year history as an admiralty court. Not surprisingly, state
and lower federal courts have subsequently struggled in finding a
consistent meaning and application of this test.18
The principled scholarly arguments for normalizing admiralty
law are subtle and complex, and a comprehensive response to them
will have to wait for another occasion. In what follows, however, I
will make two arguments about the connection between Lozman and
the normalization of admiralty law by the Supreme Court. First, I

13

See Id. at 739.
The Court’s earliest cases addressing vessel status are The Plymouth, 70
U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865) (holding that damage to a warehouse caused by a fire on
a ship did not fall within admiralty jurisdiction) and The Rock Island Bridge, 73
U.S. 213 (1867) (holding that a bridge extending over water is not a vessel). However, the earliest case of any precedential significance is Cope v. Vallette DryDock Co., 119 U.S. 625 (1887).
15
1 U.S.C. §3 (2012) (defining “vessel” as including “every description of
watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means
of transportation on water.”).
16
See Stewart v. Dutra Construction Company, 543 U.S. 481, 489–90 (2005).
Although the Court in Stewart acknowledged that “Section 3 merely codified the
meaning that the term ‘vessel’ had acquired in general maritime law” (Id., at 490),
the full embrace of 1 U.S.C. §3 as generally applicable throughout the U.S. Code
can itself be taken as a deliberate step in the direction of normalization. Id.
17
Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 741.
18
See David W. Robertson and Michael F. Sturley, Recent Developments in
Admiralty and Maritime Law at the National Level and in the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits, 40 TUL. MAR. L. J. 343, 392–93 (2016) (discussing the influence of Lozman on how state and federal courts have struggled to apply the “reasonable observer” test.)
14
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argue that the Lozman case, in which the Court radically and unpredictably shifted the boundaries of the admiralty jurisdictional tests
which depend upon vessel status, is best explained by the Court’s
adoption of a strategy of normalizing in admiralty—in this case, to
defer to Congress to take the lead in defining what is a vessel, and
for the Court to engage in common lawmaking only interstitially and
as Congress clearly intends. The Court, from the beginning of the
case, understood its task narrowly, as merely an exercise in statutory
construction, and not also aiming at having its reasoning and conclusion cohere with over a century of precedent; it then developed a
test for vessel status that has no discernable basis in either the
Court’s jurisprudence or federal statute. These and other aspects of
the case are explainable only in terms of its implicit acceptance of
the view that federal admiralty law should be normalized. Second, I
will argue that these troubling aspects of Lozman, coupled with the
apparent and unusual carelessness displayed by the Court in reviewing the case,19 constitute an argument against the normalization of
admiralty. While there may be principled reasons to resist normalization, Lozman suggests a pragmatic argument against that approach: adopting it encourages the Court to abandon its history as a
national admiralty court and to develop unprincipled and arbitrary
rules of decision, amounting to an abandonment of the constitutional
duty to develop a uniform, coherent general maritime law of the
United States.
In Parts I–II, I briefly set out the relevant legal and procedural
background leading up to the Lozman judgment. In Part I, I review
the relevant federal law determining vessel status at the time of the
Court’s granting of certiorari on Lozman. In Part II, I evaluate the
reasons for and against the granting of certiorari, and conclude that
the ex ante case for certiorari was dubious at best. I then adduce
evidence, based on both the oral argument of Lozman and extra-judicial statements of Chief Justice Roberts, which indicates that the
Court did not take review of the Lozman case seriously, and that it
did not sufficiently appreciate the significance and possible ramifications of its ruling for the coherence of the larger body of federal
admiralty law. In Part III, I critically discuss Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in the case, in which the Court invents a new test for
19

See infra, Part II.
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vessel test from whole cloth; I then discuss Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, which is far more attentive to the Court’s earlier cases, and
therefore rejects the majority’s implicit endorsement of normalizing
admiralty. In Part IV, I outline the arguments for the normalization
of admiralty law developed over the last twenty years by federal
courts scholars. Finally, in Part V, I show that Lozman is best understood as an exercise in the normalization of admiralty by the Court,
and argue that Lozman demonstrates, from a practical point of view,
many of the vices of normalizing federal admiralty law, precisely
because it severely limits the Court’s role in shaping it. I argue that
the Lozman case thus constitutes a pragmatic argument against any
further implementation of a normalization strategy in federal admiralty jurisprudence.
I. SETTING THE STAGE: VESSEL STATUS BEFORE LOZMAN
Before approaching Lozman, it is necessary to briefly summarize the state of the law on vessel status, which is often one aspect
of determining admiralty jurisdiction, prior to the Lozman case
reaching the Supreme Court. Section 3 of the Rules of Construction
Act provides that “the word ‘vessel’ includes every description of
watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being
used, as a means of transportation on water.”20 This definition has
been codified in federal law since 1873,21 but the Supreme Court
and the federal circuits have long been ambivalent about whether
the Section 3 definition is the, or even an, authoritative standard in
determining vessel status. Before Lozman, the Supreme Court decided six cases significantly addressing the issue of what constitutes
a vessel under federal admiralty law. One of those cases, The Robert
W. Parsons,22 which was decided thirty years after the statutory definition was enacted, was regarded for decades as the leading case in
the Court’s vessel status jurisprudence, and it does not mention Section 3 at all. The Court’s attention to the issue has also been sporadic.
There was an active period in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth
century, over a span of thirty-nine years (1887–1926), during which

20
21
22

1 U.S.C. §3 (2012).
See Stewart, 543 U.S. at 489–90.
191 U.S. 17 (1903).

946

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:938

the Court found vessel status in four cases and offered a line of substantive reasoning justifying those conclusions.23 A fifth, relatively
easy case (involving an ordinary barge) came in 1944.24 There was
then a sixty-one year period in which the Court was silent on vessel
status, though the lower courts, and especially the Fifth Circuit, developed vessel status jurisprudence considerably during that time,
and, again, often without relying on 1 U.S.C. §3 at all.25
The Court’s long reticence on vessel status ended with review of
a case from the First Circuit, Stewart v Dutra Construction Co.26In
Stewart, the plaintiff was injured while working on the Super Scoop,
one of the largest floating dredges in the world, while digging what
is now the Ted Williams Tunnel beneath Boston Harbor.27 The
plaintiff subsequently filed a claim for compensation under the
Jones Act.28 Since the Jones Act provides a cause of action for negligence for injured seamen, the Court had to determine whether the
plaintiff was a seaman under the definition provided by the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, “a master or member of a crew of any vessel.”29 That determination rested entirely on
whether the Super Scoop was a vessel within that definition of a
seaman.
23

See Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625, 627–28 (1887) (holding
that a floating dry-dock was not a vessel); The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. at
33–34 (holding that a horse-drawn Erie Canal boat was a vessel); Ellis v. United
States, 206 U.S. 246 (1907) (holding that scows and floating dredges were vessels); Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co.v. Chero Cola Bottling Co., 271
U.S. 19 (1926) (holding that a wharfboat on the Ohio River was not a vessel).
Among these cases, only Evansville cites 1 U.S.C. §3.
24
See Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565 (1944) (holding that a barge was
a vessel), which relied on the Section 3 definition (at 572 n.4).
25
See, e.g., Davis v. Cargill, Inc., 808 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1986); Atkins v.
Greenville Shipbuilding Corporation, 411 F. 2d 279 (5 th Cir. 1969); Powers v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 643 (1 st Cir. 1973); U.S. v. Moran Towing &
Transp. Co., 374 F.2d 656 (4th Cir. 1967); Bernardo v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 314
F.2d 604 (2nd Cir. 1963). None of these cases rely on, or even reference, 1 U.S.C.
§3.
26
Stewart, 543 U.S. 481 (2005).
27
Id., at 484-485.
28
46 U.S.C. §30104 (2006).
29
33 U.S.C. §902(3)(G). The Court has long taken §902(3)(G) to provide the
statutory definition of a seaman, used to trigger coverage of the Jones Act. See
McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 347 (1991) (“‘Master or member
of a crew’ [§902(3)(G)] is a refinement of the term ‘seaman’ in the Jones Act.”).
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The Court was faced with the usual task of resolving a conflict
in the lower courts, but in this instance the conflict was unusually
one within the Fifth Circuit. In the decades leading up to Stewart,
Fifth Circuit panels had uniformly begun the vessel status inquiry
with the criteria set out in The Robert W. Parsons, examining “the
purpose for which the craft is constructed and the business in which
it is engaged,”30 but had gone in two different directions in determining vessel status of floating structures with special purposes,
such as spud barges, jack-up rigs, and other floating work platforms.31 In one line of cases, the Fifth Circuit took something close
to an anything-that-floats approach, finding vessel status even if the
structure was immobilized, moored to land, and therefore not easily
taken into navigation.32 Judge Davis summarized the approach this
way: “Despite the outward appearance of the structure at issue, if a
primary purpose of the craft is to transport passengers, cargo, or
equipment from place to place across navigable waters, then that
structure is a vessel.”33 In another line of cases, Fifth Circuit panels
took a narrower approach. Using another one of the Supreme
Court’s early cases, Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., in which a floating dry dock was deemed not a vessel,34 the Fifth Circuit occasionally did not find vessel status if the floating structure was constructed and used primarily as a work platform, was moored at the
time of the accident, and, although was capable of movement and

30

The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. at 30.
A useful summary of the disagreement within the Fifth Circuit preceding
Stewart is given by Judge Davis in Manuel v. P.A.W. Drilling & Well Service,
Inc., 135 F.3d 344, 347–351 (1998).
32
See Cook v. Belden Concrete Prods., 472 F.2d 999, 1001 (5th Cir. 1973)
(Stating that “unconventional craft [such] as submersible drilling barges and floating dredges which are designed for navigation and commerce are vessels within
general maritime and Jones Act jurisdiction and retain such status even while
moored, dry-docked, or otherwise immobilized and secured to land.”).
33
Manuel, 135 F.3d at 348 (citations omitted).
34
Cope, 119 U.S. at 627–628 (“A fixed structure, such as this dry dock is,
not used for the purpose of navigation, is not a subject of salvage service, any
more than is a wharf or a warehouse when projecting into or upon the water. The
fact that it floats on the water does not make it a ship or vessel . . . A ship or vessel,
used for navigation and commerce, though lying at a wharf and temporarily made
fast thereto, as well as her furniture and cargo, are maritime subjects, and are capable of receiving salvage service.”).
31
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sometimes did in fact move across navigable water, that transportation function was merely incidental to its primary purpose of serving
as a work platform.35
The Supreme Court in Stewart clearly found the Super Scoop in
many ways an ideal occasion to resolve this decades-long conflict,
as it was both used as a work platform but, as is typical of dredges,
required movement across navigable water in order to discharge its
function, and yet was stationary at the time of the plaintiff’s injury.
The Court began its analysis by fixing the definition of “vessel” in
1 U.S.C. §3 as the focal point of inquiry: “every description of water-craft and other contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a
means of transportation on water.” This definition, it held, “merely
codified the meaning that the term ‘vessel’ had acquired in general
maritime law”36 and “continues to supply the default definition of
‘vessel’ throughout the U.S. Code.”37 This maneuver both signalled
to the circuits that the statutory definition is to be the primary,
though not the only, object of interpretation, and also streamlined its
own interpretive task in the case.
The Stewart Court construed “capable of being used” in the statute as meaning being practically capable of such use: “the question
remains in all cases whether the watercraft’s use ‘as a means of
transportation on water’ is a practical possibility or merely a theoretical one.”38 The primary sense of theoretical capability that defeats vessel status is when a structure is “permanently moored” to
the shore.39 It further reasoned that Section 3 did not require that a
structure be used primarily for the purpose of transportation over
water, but only that it could be so used.40 Finally, it rejected a “snapshot” test of vessel status by not requiring an inquiry into whether
the watercraft was moving at the time of an accident; however,
“structures may lose their character as vessels if they have been

35

See Bernard v. Binnings Constr. Co. Inc., 741 F.2d 824, 831 (5th Cir.

1984).
36

Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 490 (2005).
Id.
38
Id. at 496.
39
Id. at 494 (“Simply put, a watercraft is not ‘capable of being used’ for maritime transport in any meaningful sense if it has been permanently moored or otherwise rendered practically incapable of transportation or movement.”).
40
Id. at 495.
37

2017]

LOST AT SEA

949

withdrawn from the water for extended periods of time.”41 On this
complex interpretation of Section 3, the Super Scoop clearly was a
vessel.42 And while the Court arguably narrowed slightly the scope
of Section 3, with the caveat of requiring practical capability of
transportation over water, defeated only by permanent mooring, it
nonetheless likely intended Stewart to bring relative certainty on the
vessel status issue for the lower courts for the foreseeable future.
But nearly immediately after Stewart was decided, a conflict between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits arose that would lead to the
Court granting certiorari on Lozman as an occasion to resolve it. In
2006, the Fifth Circuit ruled in De La Rosa v. St. Charles Gaming
Co.43 that a riverboat casino in Louisiana which was “indefinitely
moored to the land by lines tied to steel pilings”44 for the previous
five years, but was otherwise fully operational, was not a vessel because “the Defendants do not intend to use it as such. Rather, their
intent is to use it solely as an indefinitely moored floating casino. Its
operations are entirely gaming-related, and not maritime in nature.”45
Two years later, the Eleventh Circuit decided Board of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District v. M/V Belle of Orleans,46
holding that a riverboat casino that had been indefinitely moored
“with steel cables, received utility lines from land, and engaged in a
business that could have physically, if not legally, been conducted
on shore” was nonetheless a vessel for purposes of an in rem action.47 The structure was moored on Lake Ponchartrain for four
years, but had broken free and was damaged during Hurricane
Katrina. The Court explicitly rejected the Fifth Circuit’s consideration of the intention of the owner of the structure in De La Rosa, and
focused only on whether the structure was practically capable of
transportation over water. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that

41

Id. at 496.
Id. at 497.
43
474 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2006). The court quotes 1 U.S.C. §3 (Id. at 187), but
the statute seems not to have played any significant role in its reasoning.
44
Id. at 187.
45
Id.
46
535 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2008).
47
Id. at 1307.
42
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The owner’s intentions with regard to a boat are analogous to the boat’s ‘purpose,’ and Stewart clearly rejected any definition of ‘vessel’ that relies on such a
purpose. . . Under . . . De La Rosa, a boat may enter
and leave admiralty jurisdiction on the basis of state
law and the individual thoughts of the boat owner as
to what use of the boat is most desirable . . . Such a
result is clearly not what the Supreme Court intended.48
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the Belle of Orleans was a vessel for admiralty jurisdiction purposes, because it was practically capable of transportation or movement, as it was still functionally operational and could move under its own power.49
This conflict therefore set the stage for the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari on a case which would provide an opportunity to
settle several issues that arose subsequent to Stewart: (1) to address
the relevance of the intention of the owner in regards to the purpose
of the floating structure, (2) to establish some way to determine
whether a floating structure was “indefinitely” or “permanently”
moored, and (3) to comment on the relevance of these facts for determining practical capability. The next case would also give the
Court a chance to clarify (4) the substantive relationship between 1
U.S.C. §3 and the 150 years of its own precedent on vessel status,
especially given the fact that the lower courts (especially the Fifth
Circuit) have historically been inclined to rely only on the cases, and
ignore the statutory definition, at least as often as they have looked
to the statute alongside the cases for guidance.50

48

Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1312. The Eleventh Circuit’s panel discussion in Lozman included
the Seventh Circuit as also part of the inter-circuit conflict. See City of Riviera
Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, 649 F. 3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2011)
(citing Tagliere v. Harrah’s Ill. Corp., 445 F.3d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir. 2006)), which
held that a riverboat casino was a vessel for purposes of admiralty tort jurisdiction,
though stationary for the previous two years, but left opened the possibility, for
exploration on remand, that it may be deemed “permanently moored” if its owner
intends that it will never sail again.
50
See the cases cited supra note 25.
49
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II. LOZMAN: CERTIORARI, ORAL ARGUMENT, AND HAVING FUN
In Lozman, decided only eight years after Stewart, the Court
achieved none of these things. It introduced a test for vessel status
which does not obviously provide an answer to any of these questions. In fact, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
Court’s review of Lozman, from the granting of certiorari, to oral
argument and the published opinion, and even after the case was
decided when Chief Justice Roberts made some rare and revealing
public comments about the Court’s posture towards the case, suggests an unusual degree of levity and carelessness in the Court’s
handling of the substantive issues. This levity and carelessness, I
will suggest, was a compliment to, and reinforcement of, the Court’s
implicit acceptance of a strategy, in reviewing the case, to “normalize” admiralty law alongside other areas of federal law.51
A. The Granting of Certiorari
In the Petition for Certiorari, the Petitioner Lozman provided the
Court with standard grounds for granting certiorari on the Eleventh
Circuit case: evidence of an inter-circuit conflict.52 The conflict was
clear enough,53 though the fact that such a conflict exists is hardly a
sufficient, and commonly not even a necessary, condition for the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari on a case.54 The Court’s actual
51

See infra Part IV.
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Lozman (No. 11-626), 2011 WL
5834670 (quoting City of Riviera Beach, 649 F.3d at 1267):
52

[T]he Eleventh Circuit openly acknowledged that the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits have adopted different tests for determining
whether a stricture is a “vessel,” “both of which focus on the
intent of the shipowner rather than” the structure’s potential
ability to move or be towed across water. . . But, the Eleventh
Circuit explained that in Belle of Orleans it had squarely “rejected the reasoning of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.”
53

See supra notes 43–49 and accompanying text.
See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, Setting the Social
Agenda: Deciding to Review High-Profile Cases at the Supreme Court, 57 U.
KAN. L. REV. 313, 316–24 (discussing the various factors that figure into Supreme
Court Justices’ voting to grant certiorari on a case.) See also Margaret Meriwether
Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 389, 441–49
54
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reasons for ultimately granting certiorari in particular cases are
never made public, and given that its choices in granting certiorari
are completely unconstrained by Court procedure or substantive federal law, they often reflect the idiosyncratic preferences of the Justices.55
Those preferences in the Lozman case are not immediately clear,
but from the perspective of the long history of the Supreme Court’s
vessel status cases, as well as the general purposes of federal admiralty law, there were strong reasons ex ante for the Court to decline
certiorari on Lozman. First, the floating structure at issue in the case
was never an instrument of maritime commerce56—a significant
fact, given that one of the fundamental purposes of the original constitutional grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the federal
courts is the protection and facilitation of maritime commerce.57 The
Petitioner Lozman’s floating structure did not participate in, or significantly affect, maritime commerce for the entirety of the period
in which he owned it. Lozman’s long-running disputes with the city
(discussing the divergent views of Supreme Court Justices regarding the relative
importance of resolving conflicts among the circuits.).
55
See Cordray & Cordray, Setting the Social Agenda, supra note 54, at 318
(quoting Eugene Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A.
J. 253, 255 (1973)) (“With this unfettered discretion, the Justices are free to select
cases on any basis, constrained ‘solely by their individual notions of what is important or appropriate for review by the Court.’”).
56
Though it was used in maritime commerce in the incidental and trivial
sense that it was towed several times around the Florida coast. See Lozman, 133
S. Ct. at 739.
57
See Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 15 (2004) (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603, 608 (1991)) (“The
fundamental interest giving rise to maritime jurisdiction is ‘the protection of maritime commerce.’”) The Supreme Court has in fact considered six cases involving
non-commercial floating structures; two of the most significant are Foremost Insurance Co. V. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982) (holding that a collision between
two small pleasure boats in a Louisiana river was within admiralty tort jurisdiction), and Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S. A. v. Calhoun (holding that there was federal admiralty jurisdiction over a harbor crash between a jet ski and a ship). These
have, however, been met with substantial scholarly criticism. See, e.g., David W.
Robertson, Summertime Sailing and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Need for a National Admiralty Court, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 275, 279 (1998) (noting that “to
knowledgeable observers, the two decisions in combination are ridiculous, and
they have left the lower courts confronting a ridiculous array of once-manageable
questions.”).
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of Riviera Beach, which the lower courts discussed primarily as a
set of landlord-tenant issues,58 and their potential resolution by the
Court, did not obviously bear any connection to the most general
purposes of federal admiralty law.59 Second, the res in question was
arguably sui generis, a custom-made “floating shack, built out of
plywood with only 1/16” of fiberglass surrounding its unraked hull,
without proper cleats for towing, no bilge pumps, no navigation
aids, no lifeboats and other lifesaving equipment, no propulsion,
[and] no steering,”60 and so not appreciably similar to any floating
structure that might be used in maritime commerce.61 It was thus far
from clear ex ante what value any analysis by the Court regarding
the vessel status of this structure would have for the lower courts, to
owners of borderline cases of vessels such as floating casinos, to
insurers of those structures, and many others, in deciding whether a
particular craft was a vessel and thus potentially subject to the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts.
B. The Myth of Lozman as an Unimportant Case
It may be thought—and the Court may have been lead to think
in granting certiorari—that Lozman was a case which essentially
hinged on merely a definitional question of the meaning of the word
“vessel” in the U.S. Code, and therefore that the case is a minor,
technical one which does not merit much attention. This was at least
one general scholarly assessment offered after the case was decided.

58

See City of Riviera Beach, 648 F.3d at 1263, where the Eleventh Circuit
discusses the City’s “notice of eviction” issued to Lozman, and that in prior eviction proceedings in state court, the City argued that the dockage agreement “established a nonresidential tenancy under Florida Law.”
59
See infra, pp. 27–28.
60
This is the descriptive gloss given of Lozman’s floating structure in the
Eleventh Circuit’s opinion. See City of Riviera Beach, 649 F. 3d at 1269. The
court further described the structure as “unusual,” (Id.) “unorthodox,” (Id.) and an
“unusually designed craft” (Id.). Justice Sotomayor later pointed out in her dissent, Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 753, that “a surveyor was unable to find any comparable craft for sale in the State of Florida.”
61
See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S.
527, 533 (1995) (citing Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982))
(“We conceded that pleasure boats themselves have little to do with the maritime
commerce lying at the heart of the admiralty court’s basic work[.]”).
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“In many respects Lozman seems to those of us who are not admiralty specialists like a small case[.]”62 Remarkably, even some admiralty specialists do not view the vessel status issue as particularly
significant in general, and would presumably, by extension, not
view Lozman as significant either.63
What is more alarming, however, is that the Chief Justice of the
United States also seems to have shared this assessment, during and
after the Court’s review of the case. In an interview at the Fourth
Circuit Judicial Conference following the Supreme Court’s 2012–
2013 term, Chief Justice John Roberts made some unusually extensive, extra-judicial remarks about the Lozman case. He was asked
whether there were any cases from the past term which were noteworthy but had not received much media attention. Here is his response (I emphasize in bold the most important passages):
I think if you look at the cases we have out of seventy-seven – what, there are maybe a half dozen that
people are going to be talking about at the panel discussions and things like that – but some of the others
are, the littler ones can be very fascinating. I think
my favorite from the past term was a case called
Lozman, which involved the question of, in admiralty jurisdiction, over what counts as a vessel. And
62

Frederick Schauer, Analogy in the Supreme Court: Lozman v City of Riviera Beach, Florida, 2013 Sup. Ct. Rev. 405, 410 (2013); See also Id. at 431–32
(“Lozman is not an important case. It may not even be an important admiralty
case.”).
63
See Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 37 (“Fortunately in the overwhelming
majority of cases, the problem of defining a vessel does not arise because the craft
fits the common sense notion of the term as a structure built to transport goods
and passengers over water.”); Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law of
Admiralty 33 (2d ed. 1975) (stating that vessel status arises in litigation “once in
a while” and is not “of great importance.”) David Robertson and Michael Sturley
call these remarks “inexplicable” (David W. Robertson and Michael F. Sturley,
Vessel Status in Maritime Law: Does Lozman set a New Course?, 44 J. MAR. L.
& COM. 393, 395 n.14 (2013)), but the context for the remarks in each treatise
make clear that these scholars think that the vessel issue, while obviously important, is insignificant in the sense that it is not frequently a subject of litigation
given a broad consensus across both the admiralty bench and bar about what constitutes a vessel in wide range of legal contexts. Of course, these remarks were
made before Lozman was decided, and whether the case has disturbed that broad
consensus remains to be seen.
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the law has a very broad definition of what a vessel
is. And the way cases develop in the law, of course
you have something that seems to fit not comfortably
into either category. It was, depending on what side
you were on, it was either a floating home or a houseboat. [Audience laughter.] And it was a residence
that was attached to the shore more or less permanently, but which could be disengaged and would
float and could be towed around. Again, the issue
was whether it counted as a vessel or not. It was one
of those cases where a picture’s worth a thousand
words. If you look at the picture of the thing on the
water it very much looks like a house that got swept
into the ocean somehow, rather than a boat that’s underway, and that – the Court did hold that it was not
a vessel. But we had a lot of fun with it, looking at
the different characteristics, and posing a lot of interesting hypotheticals at the argument.64
Several aspects of these rare public comments by the Chief Justice are noteworthy. First, it is abundantly clear that Chief Justice
Roberts’ general approach to the case, consistent with the majority’s, was that it was fundamentally about fitting Lozman’s floating
structure in one category (“vessel”) or another (“not a vessel”) by
applying the “very broad” definition of “vessel” in 1 U.S.C. §3. This
is likely the sort of thing Justice Kennedy referred to during oral
argument of Lozman as “the law school game,”65 i.e., of developing
the boundaries of application of a definition by assaying a range of
both intuitive and counter-intuitive cases. Second, in his associating
the idea of “a picture’s worth a thousand words” with the Court’s
reasoning and outcome of the case, Chief Justice Roberts echoes the
majority’s emphasis on what Justice Sotomayor repeatedly calls in

64

See Chief Justice John Roberts Remarks, Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference, June 29, 2013: https://www.c-span.org/video/?313594-2/chief-justice-johnroberts-remarks (my emphasis).
65
Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Lozman v. The City of Riviera Beach,
Florida, 133 U.S. 735 (2013) (No 11-626) (Oct. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Transcript].
See infra, Part II.C.
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her dissent mere “esthetic features,”66 features which are, and always have been, irrelevant in determining vessel status. Third, the
Chief Justice’s general disposition towards the case appears to be
one of amusement. He describes Lozman as one of the Court’s “littler” cases of the term, though the sense in which he believes Lozman is a “little” case is not clear. The context of this remark within
his full response suggests that he thinks it is a “little” case precisely
because it required, in his view, merely entertaining far-fetched examples of possible vessels, and studying pictures of both Lozman’s
floating home and of other vessels and non-vessels, and then making
a determination on those bases. This seems to be the explanation for
why the Court “had a lot of fun with it.”
The suggestions that the issue of what is and is not a vessel under
federal admiralty law is relatively insignificant, and that a case hinging on that issue is likewise unimportant, are on their face absurd.
But the fact that this was suggested by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States is even more troubling. Even those
who are not admiralty specialists can surmise that a vessel status
determination may trigger the applicability of a large body of federal
law, the consequences of which may be significant, indeed, dispositive.67 The most obvious example is the distinctive admiralty in rem
action, which by definition can be taken only against vessels.68
Moreover, the applicability of a significant number of federal statutes also depends on the determination of vessel status, including
66

Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 752 and 753 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
It is also notable in this context that Chief Justice Roberts, while not perhaps a specialist in admiralty, has some experience in the area, and with questions
of admiralty jurisdiction in particular. Nearly twenty years before Lozman, and
well before the beginning of his tenure as Chief Justice, he represented Great
Lakes Dredge and Dock Company in an important admiralty jurisdiction case before the Supreme Court. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 529. His arguments were ultimately
persuasive. See Joseph Blocher, Roberts’ Rules: The Assertiveness of Rules-Based
Jurisprudence, 46 Tulsa L. Rev. 431, 431–432 (2011) (discussing Chief Justice
Roberts’ arguments as counsel in Grubart and his reliance on the Court’s acceptance of them in his later briefs as counsel in the Supreme Court).
68
See The Rock Island Bridge, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 213, 216 (1867) (holding
that admiralty in rem actions can be brought only against vessels), later codified
in the Supplemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule C(1), 28 U.S.C.A.
(2016) (authorizing an action in rem “to enforce any maritime lien” or “whenever
a statute of the United States provides for a maritime action in rem of a proceeding
analogous thereto.”).
67
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the Maritime Lien Act,69 the Oil Pollution Act,70 the Ship Mortgage
Act,71 the Admiralty Extension Act,72 and many others.73
But more generally, the claim that a case which defines the very
subject matter of a well-entrenched and vast area of federal law—
that is, a case which defines the very entities which that area of law
explicitly governs—is somehow an “unimportant” or “little” case
can hardly be sustained. It should be obvious, for example, that the
cases which determine the definition (and therefore, the core set) of
objects of other areas of federal regulation are not trivial or “little.”
It has never been suggested that cases which answer such questions
as “what is a security?,”74 “what is a seizure?,”75 “what is a supervisor?,”76 “what is a major life activity?,”77 and countless others, are
minor cases of little consequence. A Supreme Court case in admiralty setting out the generally applicable definition of the primary
maritime object of federal regulation is not relevantly different from
these cases, cases which are generally regarded as of fundamental
importance to whole bodies of federal regulation.

46 U.S. §31341 (granting a maritime lien to a one who provides “necessaries to a vessel”), the statute which was the basis of the federal litigation in
Lozman.
70
33 U.S.C.A. §§2701–2761 (regulating the discharge of oil by vessels on
navigable waters).
71
46 U.S.C. §31322 (giving priority to certain mortgages covering “the
whole of the vessel.”).
72
46 U.S.C. §30101 (extending admiralty jurisdiction to “cases of injury or
damage, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable waters.”).
73
See David Robertson, Border Wars: Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach,11
BENEDICT’S MAR. BULL. 18 (2013) (discussing the various contexts in federal law
in which vessel status is important).
74
See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (defining “security” under
the Securities Act of 1933 §2(1), 15 U.S.C. §77b(1) (2016)).
75
See Michigan v. Chestnut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988) (defining “seizure” under
the Fourth Amendment).
76
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (defining “supervisor” for purposes
of determining employers’ vicarious liability for the unlawful actions of supervisory employees in Title VII hostile environment sexual harassment cases).
77
See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (defining “major life activity”
under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
69
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C. Oral Argument and Having Fun
Chief Justice Roberts’s extra-judicial comments that, in Lozman,
the Court “had a lot of fun” with one of its “littler cases” indicate
that the Court may have reviewed the case with an unusual degree
of levity. This is further supported by certain aspects of how oral
argument in the case proceeded, in which the Justices demonstrated
a consistently unhelpful methodological approach to resolving the
vessel status issue, and thereby revealed a shared sense that this was
an insignificant case.
First, it was clear throughout the oral argument of Lozman that
a majority of the Court were of the view that the case was to be
resolved merely by an exercise in statutory interpretation, specifically by engaging in the narrow task of interpreting the word “vessel” in 1 U.S.C. §3, completely independently of the Court’s prior
vessel status cases. Almost immediately, Chief Justice Roberts indicated this. When Jeffrey Fisher, counsel for Lozman, began by arguing for a purpose-based test rooted in Evansville78 and other cases,
the Chief Justice responded: “Well, that just has—I understand the
argument. It’s got no connection whatever to the statutory language,
right? . . . Capable is in the statute, purpose is not, right?”79 Similar
concerns about how only Section 3 applies, without any reference to
earlier cases, were expressed by Justice Alito,80 Justice Kagan,81

Evansville, 271 U.S. at 22 (the wharfboat “performed no function that
might not have been performed as well by an appropriate structure on the land and
by a floating stage or platform permanently attached to the land.”).
79
Transcript at 5 (statement of Chief Justice Roberts).
80
See Transcript at 11 (statement of Justice Alito) (“I just don’t see how you
can get purpose into this statutory language”); Transcript at 14 (statement of Justice Alito) (“I don’t see how they get—how you get [purpose or indefinite mooring] into the words of the statute.”).
81
See Transcript at 40 (statement of Justice Kagan) (“You’re reading the statute – you’re reading the statute as if it says something can be transported over
water. But the statute doesn’t say that. It says something can be used or capable
of being used as a means of transportation on water. So that – that the question is
whether this thing is transporting other things over water, and whether that’s its
function; and in my hypothetical it’s not its function. Its function is to serve as a
house. That house happens to be on water, but it’s just a house.”).
78
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Justice Kennedy,82 and Justice Scalia.83 There was even some mild
hostility expressed by the Court towards its own vessel cases. While
Fisher was arguing for a test based on function or purpose—he used
the terms interchangeably—Justice Kagan interjected: “Well, then
you’re not talking about purpose; you’re talking about function,
right? You’re just using purpose as a kind of strange synonym for
function.”84 The strangeness of Fisher’s alleged equivocation she attributed to the Court’s line of vessel status cases: “So you are really
talking about a function test. And you are using strange words, because they come out of our opinions—kind of not your fault.”85
Second, perhaps because the Court considered its role in the case
as developing a workable interpretation of the word “vessel” under
the statutory definition, and nothing more, it employed a method of
interpretation which seemed naturally suited to the task. The method
can be characterized as a species of reductio ad absurdum: start with
a tentative definition proposed by counsel, then imagine some conceptually possible scenario which involves an object which would
notionally fall under the proposed definition. If it does, and that application of the definition is intuitively objectionable, then the definition should be discarded and another one considered which does
not extend to the imagined objectionable scenario; the new definition is then subjected to the same scrutiny by example and counterexample.
The rigorous application of this method by the Court had a particular effect on the course of oral argument: it devolved at times
into the Justices suggesting a series of absurd, and seemingly irrelevant, putative counter-examples to various interpretations of 1
U.S.C. §3. David Frederick, counsel for Riviera Beach, who argued
for something approaching an “anything-that-floats” test,86 had to
82

See Transcript at 43 (statement of Justice Kennedy) (“Does it carry goods
under the statute[?]”).
83
See Transcript at 12 (statement of Justice Scalia) (“Can I ask about that
definition? That definition comes from the Rules of Construction Act, right . . .
which provides the meaning of all – of the word vessel as used in the United States
Code. Okay?”).
84
Transcript at 11 (statement of Justice Kagan).
85
Id. at 14 (statement of Justice Kagan) (my emphasis).
86
Id. at 31 (statement of David Frederick, Counsel for City of Riviera Beach,
Florida) (“Our position is that the houseboat is a vessel under section 3 because it
floats, moves, and carries people or things on water[.]”).
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consider a total of ten such presumed counterexamples from the
Court: an inner tube,87 cup,88 garage door,89 an inner tube with pennies pasted on it,90 a Styrofoam sofa,91 a Styrofoam sofa carrying a
coffee can,92 a floating sofa carrying a cushion,93 a floating advertising sign,94 a trampoline,95 a “kind of a log next to a beach somewhere,”96 and a Polynesian boat in a museum.97 Justice Breyer, who
would later author the majority opinion, offered seven of the ten hypotheticals. With each example, the clearly intended purpose of introducing it was to suggest that the broad definition under consideration is overbroad, inappropriate, or otherwise unacceptable, because it encompassed the counter-intuitive example of a (possible)
vessel.
Early in the proceedings, Justice Kennedy explained this style of
questioning by remarking to Lozman’s counsel, Jeffrey Fisher, “you
know the law school game.”98 Later Justice Kennedy suggested that
the Court was in search of a “universal definition”‘of what a floating
home is or is not, which would assist in deciding the case.99 As
something like the statement of a methodology, this smacks of the
old, a priori method of philosophical investigation made famous by
Socrates as depicted in the dialogues of Plato from the fifth century
BCE.100 While this method of inquiry has a venerable history in philosophy and other disciplines, its relevance for answering questions
of fundamental importance about federal law is not obvious.
Riviera Beach’s counsel, David Frederick, understandably
seemed perplexed and even annoyed by the Court’s employment of
87

Id. at 31–32 (statement of Chief Justice Roberts).
Id. at 32 (statement of Justice Breyer).
89
Id. (statement of Justice Sotomayor).
90
Id. (statement of Justice Kagan).
91
Id. at 36 (statement of Justice Breyer).
92
Id. at 37 (statement of Justice Breyer).
93
Id. at 39 (statement of Justice Breyer).
94
Id. at 44 (statement of Justice Breyer).
95
Id. at 46 (statement of Justice Sotomayor).
96
Id. at 51 (statement of Justice Breyer).
97
Id. at 24 (statement of Justice Breyer).
98
Id. at 8 (statement of Justice Kennedy).
99
Id. at 17 (statement of Justice Kennedy).
100
See Gregory Vlastos, The Socratic Elenchus, 1 OXFORD STUD. OF ANCIENT
PHIL. 27 (1983) (discussing the method of argument and refutation employed by
Socrates in Plato’s early dialogues).
88
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this method and the repeated proposal of many practically irrelevant
and ridiculous examples. While respectfully attempting to respond
to each, he twice offered a pragmatic rebuttal to the esoteric line of
questioning. In response to Justice Kagan’s pennies-on-the-innertube hypothetical, Frederick responded: “Justice Kagan, I—I think
we could imagine all kinds of de minimis types of hypotheticals that
would satisfy the basic criteria. But what the Court in Stewart said
was practical capability as viewed in a real world sense.”101 And,
again, in response to Justice Breyer’s floating-sofa-carrying-a-cushion example: “I think I’ve given up the absurd hypos because there
[is] no litigation on them.”102 These are surely the correct responses
to this absurd and inexplicable line of questioning by the Court.
III. LOZMAN V. THE CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH, FLORIDA
The substance of the Court’s 7-2 opinion in Lozman reflects the
same general trajectory of concern and argument which it demonstrated during oral argument, particularly with respect to the following three assumptions: (1) that providing an interpretation of 1
U.S.C. §3 was the only task before them in the case, 103 (2) that an
interpretation of 1 U.S.C. §3 should be arrived at primarily by reflecting on various imaginary examples of possible vessels, however
absurd, in order to test the soundness of their interpretation, and that
(3) the prior Supreme Court cases and those in the Circuits addressing vessel status are in themselves of little or no relevance in carrying out this task.
A. The Majority’s Opinion
Justice Breyer wrote for the 7-2 majority.104 The Court began by
not just limiting its starting point to determining the meaning of 1
101

Id. at 33 (statement of David C. Frederick, Counsel for City of Riviera
Beach, Florida) (emphasis added).
102
Id. at 39 (statement of David C. Frederick, Counsel for City of Riviera
Beach, Florida) (emphasis added).
103
Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 739. See also Robertson and Sturley, supra note 63,
at 445 (“The majority began by recognizing that it was deciding a statutory construction case.”).
104
Lozman was only the second majority opinion in admiralty jurisdiction he
has authored while a Justice of the Supreme Court. The other was Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875 (1997) (holding that an admiralty
tort plaintiff cannot recover for physical damage a defective product causes to the
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U.S.C. §3, but characterized the locus of interpretation even narrower, by focusing “primarily upon the statutory phrase ‘capable of
being used . . . as a means of transportation on water.’”105 It immediately disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation as “too
broad,” which lead to the conclusion that Lozman’s floating structure was a vessel merely because it could float, could proceed under
tow, and its shore connections did not render it “practically incapable of transportation or movement.”106 The Court continued its fixation, carried on from oral argument,107 in contemplating absurd
counterexamples to demonstrate the inadequacy of the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of the statute. That interpretation was incorrect,
the Court said, because it would also confer vessel status on “a
wooden washtub, a plastic dishpan, a swimming platform on pontoons, a large fishing net, a door taken off its hinges, or Pinocchio
(when inside the whale).”108 To avoid these prima facie absurd consequences, the Court stated that it must “apply this definition in a
‘practical,’ not a ‘theoretical,’ way.”109 The Court here cites Stewart

product itself, but for damage the product causes to other property.) Lozman was
the seventh admiralty opinion Justice Breyer had authored in his (up to that time)
thirty-three year career as a federal judge. As a judge on the First Circuit Court of
Appeals (1980–1994), he authored five opinions in admiralty. All upheld the judgments of the lower district court, and ranged from two and a half to seven pages
in length. See Jordan v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1984) (affirming
judgment of the district court in favor of defendant against an unseaworthiness
claim); Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50 (1st Cir. 1985) (affirming judgment of the district court in favor of defendant against a claim of pure
economic loss caused by oil spill); Cerqueira v. Cerqueria, 828 F.2d 863 (1st Cir.
1987) (affirming judgment of the district court in favour of defendant against
claim for damages based on unseaworthiness, the Jones Act, and maintenance and
cure); Lyon v. Ranger III, 858 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1988) (affirming judgment of the
district court in admiralty allocating fault according to comparative negligence
principles of Massachusetts law in a wrongful death action under general maritime
law); Butler v. American Trawler Co., Inc., 887 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989) (affirming
the district court’s finding of admiralty tort jurisdiction).
105
Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 739.
106
Id. at 740 (quoting Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, TwoStory Vessel Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in Length, 649 F.3d 1259, 1266
(2011)).
107
See supra, Part II.
108
Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 740.
109
Id. at 741 (quoting Stewart, 543 U.S. at 496).
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for support of this constraint, but in fact this use of the practical/theoretical distinction is altogether different than the one at work in
Stewart, where the Court stated: “The question remains in all cases
whether the watercraft’s use ‘as a means of transportation on water’
is a practical possibility or merely a theoretical one.” 110 In Stewart,
the practicality was in reference to the possibility of a craft being
used as a means of water transport. In Lozman, the practicality now
qualifies the application of the Section 3 definition as a whole.
Whereas in Stewart the Court aimed to interpret Section 3 as applying to watercraft in which its use as a means of transportation over
water was a practical, that is, a real possibility and not merely a conceptually possible one, the Court in Lozman is seeking a definition
that can be “practically,” that is, sensibly or pragmatically, applied
across a given range of cases. This equivocation on “practical,”
which allows a creative appropriation of Stewart, is a further indication of the Lozman Court’s narrowing of the substantive legal issue even further to one of only statutory construction, rather than
attempting, as the Stewart Court does, a holistic and coherent approach which aims to make the Section 3 interpretation consistent
with and intelligible in terms of the long line of Supreme Court vessel cases stretching back to the late nineteenth century.
With this brief introduction in Lozman, the majority proceeds by
setting out the following new test for vessel status under Section 3:
[A] structure does not fall within the scope of this
statutory phrase unless a reasonable observer, looking to the [structure’s] physical characteristics and
activities, would consider it designed to a practical
degree for carrying people or things over water.111

110

Stewart, 543 U.S. at 496.
Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 741. The Court later suggests that this test “should
offer guidance in a significant number of borderline cases where ‘capacity’ to
transport over water is in doubt.” Id. at 745. But there is no indication in the formulation of the reasonable observer test, nor elsewhere, that the Court intends for
it to be applied only in borderline cases, but rather that it is set forth as a general
test for vessel status, which will be of particular guidance in borderline cases. That
the general test will offer guidance in borderline cases is merely a foreseeable
(and, in the Court’s view, desirable) consequence of its promulgation. See generally id. at 741.
111
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As Justice Sotomayor notes, correctly, in her dissent,112 this test
not only has no basis in any vessel status case the Court, or even any
of the circuits, have ever decided; it has no basis in any admiralty
case in the history of the Court or the circuits.113 Besides its lack of
basis in the Court’s precedent, the test has the additional prima facie
weakness that it makes use of what some legal scholars have called
an “extravagantly vague” term—here the notion of a reasonable observer—which inherently admits of such broad application that it
runs the risk of incoherence and consequently failing to guide behaviour.114 It is no surprise then that the remainder of the Court’s
112

Id. at 748, 751 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). See also, infra, Part III.B.
The only appearance of a “reasonable observer” test in the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence has been in a line of Establishment Clause cases, obviously a context far removed from the concerns of admiralty law. See, e.g., Witters v. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 493 (1986) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“No reasonable observer is likely to draw from the facts before us an
inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief.”); Cty. of
Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 620 (1989)
(“While an adjudication of the display’s effect must take into account the perspective of one who is neither Christian nor Jewish . . . the constitutionality of its effect
must also be judged according the standard of a ‘reasonable observer.’”); Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995) (“[W]hen
the reasonable observer would view a government practice as endorsing religion,
I believe that it is our duty to hold the practice invalid.”) (emphasis in original);
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 707 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Viewed
on its face, Texas’ display . . . does [not] provide the reasonable observer with any
basis to guess that it was erected to honor any individual or organization.”). The
Court’s reasonable observer test in the Establishment Clause context has been met
with sharp scholarly criticism and has been difficult to implement in the lower
courts. See B. Jessie Hill, Anatomy of the Reasonable Observer, 79 BROOK. L.
REV. 1407, 1413–18 (2014) (discussing the problems with the reasonable observer test in Establishment Clause cases); Susan Hanley Kosse, A Missed Opportunity to Abandon the Reasonable Observer Framework in Sacred Text Cases:
McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky and Van Orden v. Perry, 4 FIRST AMEND.
L. REV. 139, 149 (2006) (same); Benjamin I. Sachs, Whose Reasonableness
Counts?, 107 YALE L.J. 1523, 1524–25 (1998) (same).
114
See Timothy Endicott, The Value of Vagueness, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 14, 18 (Andrei Marmor & Scott
Soames, eds., 2011).
113

When law-makers use vague language in framing standards,
they typically use extravagantly vague language such as ‘neglected’ or ‘abandoned’ or ‘reasonable’. The resulting vagueness in the law can generate serious and deep disputes over the
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discussion is taken up with attempting to coherently carve out a set
of features which ought to be taken as relevant to the reasonable
observer, and the presence of which in a structure will therefore
ground a determination of vessel status.
The features of Lozman’s floating structure which the Court
found relevant to finding that it was not a vessel included that it had
“no rudder or other steering mechanism[,]”115 “[i]ts hull was unraked,”116 that “it had a rectangular bottom 10 inches below the water[,]”117 it had “no special capacity to generate or store electricity”
and had to receive electricity via connections to land,118 its rooms
“looked like ordinary nonmaritime living quarters[,]”119 and from
within, a person looked out from those quarters “not through watertight portholes, but through French doors or ordinary windows.”120
Moreover, while not dispositive, the structure “lack[ed] self-propulsion” and was towed “on only four occasions over a period of seven
years.”121 These features suggest that the structure was not “design[ed] to transport over water anything other than its own furnishings and related personal effects.”122
Despite the fact that the “reasonable observer” test and its application to the res in Lozman were both unprecedented, the Court
nonetheless asserted that its interpretation of Section 3 “is consistent
with its text, precedent, and relevant purposes.”123 The Court’s language here is not entirely clear, especially when reading the Court’s
principles of the standard in question. Because it may allow different, incompatible views as to the nature of the standard and
the principles of its application (even among sincere and competent interpreters), it leads to the danger that its application
will be incoherent. By that I mean that decision made in purported application of the norm will not be intelligible as the application of a single norm—a standard that can regulate behaviour. Id.
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 741.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 31 (1903)).
Id.
Id.
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previous Section 3 interpretation. At first glance, the pronoun referring to the statute (“its”) ranges over all three considerations, such
that the Court’s claim is that its interpretation of Section 3 is consistent with the text of Section 3, only the precedent applying Section 3, and the relevant purposes of Section 3. But what the court
seems to have meant is that their interpretation is consistent with its
text, the “bulk of”124 its vessel status precedent (regardless of
whether that precedent interpreted Section 3),125 and “the purposes
of major federal maritime statutes,” rather than only with the purpose of Section 3.126 In regards to the text of Section 3, the Court
maintained that its interpretation was consistent with it, even given
its broad language of referring to “every description of watercraft or
other artificial contrivance.”127
To support its contention that the “reasonable observer” interpretation of Section 3 is consistent with “the bulk of precedent,” the
Court considers only three of its six previous cases regarding vessel
status.128 The Court suggests that its finding that Lozman’s floating
structure is not a vessel is consistent with Evansville, in which the
Court held that a wharfboat was not a vessel, even though, similar
to the structure in Lozman, “[it] floated next to a dock,” was used
“to transfer cargo from ship to dock and ship to ship,” was connected
to the dock by cables, utility lines, and a ramp, and not only was
capable of being towed, but was towed annually.129 Additionally,
the Court cites Stewart as consistent with its conclusions, since the
dredge in Stewart had, but the structure in Lozman lacked, “a captain
and crew, navigational lights, ballast tanks, and a crew dining
area.”130 Finally, the Court compares its determinations in Cope,

124

Id. at 742.
For example, the Court considers The Robert W. Parsons, Cope, and
Grubart, none of which even mention the Section 3 definition of “vessel.” See,
e.g., The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 31 (1903); Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock
Co., 119 U.S. 625, 625 (1887); Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock. Co., 513 U.S. 527, 535 (1995).
126
Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 743.
127
Id. at 741 (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 3) (2012)) (emphasis in original).
128
Id. at 741–43.
129
Id. at 742 (citing Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola
Bottling Co., 271 U.S. 19, 46 (1926)).
130
Id. (quoting Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 484 (2005)).
125

2017]

LOST AT SEA

967

finding that a floating drydock was not a vessel because it was permanently affixed to a wharf,131 and Grubart, finding that a barge
sometimes used for transportation was a vessel,132 as consistent with
its conclusion in Lozman in relying on the consideration that, unlike
the barge in Grubart, Lozman’s floating structure was not regularly,
nor primarily, used for transportation purposes.133 Suffice it to say
that the Court’s engagement with its own precedent is perfunctory,
at least as compared with its usual practice in admiralty cases. Less
than a decade earlier, for example, the Court in Stewart showed considerably more attention to precedent, citing a total of thirty-one
cases in the course of its majority opinion. The Lozman court cited
only twenty-two cases, a decrease of nearly one-third as compared
to Stewart; the majority cited only one more case than Justice Sotomayor cited in her dissent.134
The Court also maintained that their finding of no vessel status
on the basis of the “reasonable observer” test was consistent with
“the purposes of major federal maritime statutes.”135 The Court cites
as examples the attachment procedure established by the Federal
Maritime Lien Act,136 the purpose of which is to allow plaintiffs to
seize a vessel as a security interest for “provision of ‘necessaries to
a vessel’” given the possibility that the vessel may sail away to escape liability,137 and the Limitation of Liability Act,138 which “can
encourage shipowners to engage in port-related commerce.”139 Because the Petitioner Lozman “cannot easily escape liability by sailing away in his home” and “does not significantly engage in port-

131

Id. at 743 (citing Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625, 627 (1887).
Id. (citing Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock. Co.,
513 U.S. 527, 535 (1995)). The Court in Grubart, however, offered no reasoned
argument as to why the barge was a vessel, as that finding was never challenged
by Petitioners in the case. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 535 (“Petitioners do not here seriously dispute the conclusion of each court below that the Great Lakes barge is,
for admiralty tort purposes, a ‘vessel.’”).
133
Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 743.
134
See infra, Part III.B.
135
Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 743–44.
136
See id. See also 46 U.S.C. §§ 31341–31343 (2012).
137
Id. at 739 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 31342 (2012)).
138
See 46 U.S.C. § 30505 (2012).
139
Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 744.
132
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related commerce[,]”140 there is little reason to classifying his floating structure as a vessel.141
Regarding the brief attention given to the purpose of federal
maritime statutes, it is worth noting one thing the Court declined to
do, which is to ask the broader question of whether the introduction
of the unprecedented “reasonable observer” test and its application
which rendered Lozman’s floating structure not a vessel, served the
purposes of the whole of federal maritime law, including both statutes and general maritime law. If the Court would have recalled that
the “‘fundamental interest’ giving rise to maritime jurisdiction is
‘the protection of maritime commerce[,]’”142 the claim that Lozman
did not significantly engage in port-related commerce would have
suggested a more palatable resolution to the case. It would have been
much more consistent with its precedent for the Court to reason that
Lozman’s floating structure was a vessel under the broad Section 3
definition, but that nonetheless there was no federal interest in applying federal law in the case. For example, the Court could have
found that the dispute between Lozman and the City of Riviera
Beach was “maritime but local,” and therefore that Florida state law
should apply,143 just as it had in prior proceedings in Florida state

140

Id.
The factual assertions here are dubious at best. As the Court acknowledges,
Lozman could sail away and did in fact do so several times, albeit under tow;
moreover, Lozman was engaged in standard maritime commercial activity in being party to a dockage agreement with the city of Riviera Beach. See Lozman, 133
S. Ct. at 739.
142
Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 25 (2004) (quoting Exxon Corp.
v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603, 608 (1991)).
143
See W. Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921) (citing S. Pac. Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917)), where the Court held that an admiralty action for
the wrongful death of a longshoreman killed while working on an anchored ship
in San Francisco Bay was barred by California’s one-year statute of limitations
on the ground that:
141

The subject is maritime and local in character and the specified
modification of or supplement to the rule applied in admiralty
courts, when following the common law, will not work material
prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime
law, nor interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of
that law in its international and interstate relations.
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court between Lozman and Riviera Beach.144 Or it could have held
that Florida’s interest in regulating dockage agreements between a
city and the owner of a structure that functions as the owner’s floating home outweighs any federal interest in regulating them. 145 Or
the Court could have declined to apply federal law in order to “accommodate” the local, state interest in regulating the dispute.146 Or
the Court could have resorted to the more general and entrenched
Jensen test, according to which Florida law could apply because it
did not “contravene[] the essential purpose expressed by an act of
Congress” or “interfere[] with the proper harmony and uniformity
of that law in its international and interstate relations.”147 This sort
of argument would have avoided the need to fashion a new interpretation of 1 U.S.C. § 3 from whole cloth, and would have expressed,
arguably more coherently in regards to the body of federal maritime
See also Robertson & Sturley, supra note 63, at 432 (describing the dispute between Lozman and the City of Riviera Beach, prior to the granting of certiorari,
as “a local human-interest story with an eccentric cast of characters[.]”).
144
See City of Riviera Beach v. Lozman, 649 F.3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir.
2011).
145
An approach suggested in Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d
623, 628 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 738–
42 (1961) (“Where substantive law is involved, we think that the Supreme Court’s
past decisions yield no single, comprehensive test as to where harmony is required
and when uniformity must be maintained. Rather, the decisions however couched
reflect a balancing of the state and federal interests in any given case.”)).
146
See Kossick, 365 U.S. at 739 (citations omitted):
[T]he fact that maritime law is—in a special sense at least—
federal law and therefore supreme by virtue of Article VI of the
Constitution, carries with it the implication that wherever a
maritime interest is involved, no matter how slight or marginal,
it must displace a local interest, no matter how pressing and significant. But the process is surely rather one of accommodation,
entirely familiar in many areas of overlapping state and federal
concern, or a process somewhat analogous to the normal conflict of laws situation where two sovereignties assert divergent
interests in a transaction as to which both have some concern.
Surely the claim of federal supremacy is adequately served by
the availability of a federal forum in the first instance and of
review in this Court to provide assurance that the federal interest is correctly assessed and accorded due weight.
147

Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216.
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law, the Court’s judgment that federal law should not be concerned
with Lozman’s floating structure and ones like it. However, because
the Court saw its task from the beginning as merely giving an interpretation of a statutory definition, these strategies and arguments
were not salient, and so ab initio foreclosed.
A final, distinctive aspect of the Court’s opinion which has not
been noted, much less discussed, in the scholarly treatments of the
case148 is the Appendix, in which the Court attached a photo of the
floating structure at issue in the case, as well as a 1928 photo of a
wharfboat similar to the one from Evansville, on which the Court
also declined to confer vessel status.149 The Court’s inclusion of
photographs of a floating structure, or of any sort of maritime apparatus, is unprecedented in admiralty, and the purpose of including
them in this case is far from clear.150 It has been cogently argued that
the Court’s general practice of attaching photographs to its opinions
is fraught with problems.151 In this regard, Lozman is no exception.
The observation that “[v]isual attachments are much more likely to
148

For example, in an otherwise exhaustive discussion of the Lozman litigation, the Appendix to the Court’s opinion is mentioned only in passing. See, e.g.,
Robertson, supra note 63, at 417 n.140.
149
See Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 747–48.
150
Prior to Lozman, no attachment of any sort (photograph, map, replica, reproduction, etc.) has ever been included in a Supreme Court majority opinion in
admiralty. In only one other admiralty case, Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499
U.S. 585, 605 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting), in which the Court had to determine
whether the plaintiffs were given fair notice of a forum-selection clause which
appeared on their passage contract tickets, Justice Stevens in his dissent reproduced images of the ticket as part of his argument that notice was not reasonable.
Id.
151
See Hampton Dellinger, Words Are Enough: The Troublesome Use of Photographs, Maps, and Other Images in Supreme Court Opinions, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 1704, 1753 (1997) (citation omitted):
The legal documents that have bound and bettered our nation—
from the Declaration of Independence to Brown v. Board of Education—have been plain and unencumbered, yet clear and
powerful. A review of the Supreme Court’s use of photographs,
maps, replicas, and reproductions shows the items generally to
be incompatible with such ideals . . . .Unless the Court is willing
to adopt measures to enhance the accuracy of visual attachments, or at least disclose their inherent distortions, this unnecessary practice should stop.
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obscure the best available legal answer rather than reveal it”152 is
particularly apt here. The photographs present a limited, two-dimensional perspective on the structures, from which little information
can be gleaned concerning their relevant physical characteristics (especially their subsurface features which cannot be seen, but would
provide important details as to design, structure, and possible uses).
Nor is the relevance, value, or intended use of these pictures ever
explained by the Court. The inclusion of the pictures in the majority’s opinion is even more baffling upon examination of the occasions and purposes for which they are cited. Some of the allegedly
relevant features of the two floating structures mentioned in the
opinion are not even depicted in the photographs. For example, in
the initial description of the res at issue in Lozman, the Court lists
“a sitting room, bedroom, closet, bathroom, and kitchen, along with
a stairway leading to a second level with office space. An empty
bilge space underneath the main floor kept it afloat.” 153 None of
these features appear in the attached photograph; indeed, given the
physical dimensions of the structure, it would be difficult or impossible for all these features to be captured in a single photograph.
Moreover, some of the features for which the photographs are intended to be illustrations cannot be depicted at all. In citing the photograph of a 1928 wharfboat similar to the one at issue in Evansville,
the majority cited such supposedly relevant characteristics as that it
was “‘not used to carry freight from one place to another,’” and that
it did not “‘encounter perils of navigation to which crafts used for
transportation are exposed.’”154 These features cannot, even in principle, be represented in a synchronic two-dimensional representation of the structure, since the characteristics are diachronic and relational (e.g., by making implicit reference to the activities of those
employed on it, as well as the nature and frequency of navigational
activity in the waters adjacent to the structure).

152

Id.
Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 739 (citations omitted).
154
Id. at 742 (quoting Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola
Bottling Co., 271 U.S. 19, 22 (1926)).
153
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Justice Breyer once characterized himself, in reference to his judicial method, as “a bringer of chaos.”155 In Lozman’s majority opinion, he delivered. The “reasonable observer” test purports to respond
to a narrow problem of statutory construction, but consequently reflects a blinkered view of over a century of precedent which addresses both vessel status and the appropriateness of applying (or
choosing not to apply) federal maritime law to a maritime dispute
that is primarily of local, state concern. The result is a vague standard which offers limited guidance (if any) to lower courts and the
many private actors in national and international maritime industries.
B. Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent
In contrast to the majority’s ex nihilo reasoning, Justice Sotomayor does dwell at greater length in her dissent on the Court’s
vessel status precedent, as well as that of the circuits, perhaps in light
of the Court’s acknowledgement in Stewart that 1 U.S.C. § 3’s definition of “vessel” “merely codified the meaning that the term ‘vessel’ had acquired in general maritime law.”156 She seems to go further, by intimating that she fundamentally disagrees with the way
the majority has characterized its task in the case, i.e., to engage only
in an exercise of statutory construction of the Section 3 definition.
She states that “several important principles have guided both this
Court and the lower courts in determining what kinds of watercraft
fall properly within the scope of admiralty jurisdiction,”157 and yet
all of the principles she identified are rooted in the Court’s vessel
status jurisprudence and bear no fundamental relationship to Section
3 or any other federal statute.
Of the majority’s “reasonable observer” test, Justice Sotomayor
said pointedly: “This phrasing [“reasonable observer”] has never appeared in any of our cases.”158 This is a polite way of saying that the

155

GARRETT EPPS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 2014: NINE CLASHING VISIONS ON THE
SUPREME COURT 97 (2014) (citations omitted).
156
Stewart v. Durtra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 490 (2005). This explicit reference to the general maritime law is the only reference to it found in Lozman,
either in the majority opinion or dissent. See Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 742.
157
Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 749 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting).
158
Id. at 751 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting).
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majority is just making stuff up. She repeatedly criticized the inexplicable, a priori approach the majority took to developing the test,
an approach that is patently inconsistent with developing admiralty
law in the manner of a common law court, by drawing on the principles found in the Court’s own cases, as it has done for two centuries:
Certainly, difficult and marginal cases will arise.
Fortunately, courts do not consider each floating
structure anew. So, for example, when we were confronted in Stewart with the question whether a dredge
is a § 3 vessel, we did not commence with a clean
slate; we instead sought guidance from previous
cases that had confronted similar structures . . . .In
sum, our precedents offer substantial guidance for
how objectively to determine whether a watercraft is
practically capable of maritime transport and thus
qualifies as a § 3 vessel.159
As a result of “commenc[ing] with a clean slate[,]” the majority’s test has “render[ed] the § 3 inquiry opaque and unpredictable”160 and “completely malleable.”161 By impliedly overruling
many early cases on vessel status, “the majority works real damage
to what has long been a settled area of maritime law[,]”162 and “will
confuse the lower courts and upset our longstanding admiralty precedent.”163
She agreed with the majority’s criticism of the Eleventh’s Circuit’s test as overbroad, and conceded that subjective intention
should “play no role in the vessel analysis of 1 U.S.C. § 3,”164 but
suggested that the Court’s reasoning “despite its seemingly objective gloss, effectively (and erroneously) introduces a subjective
component into the vessel-status inquiry.”165 The subjectivity arises
159

Id. at 750–51 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. at 750–52 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting).
161
Id. at 753 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting).
162
Id. at 753 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing The Ark, 17 F.2d 446, 447
(S.D. Fla. 1926)).
163
Id. at 755 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
164
Id. at 748 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
165
Id. at 751 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
160
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from the majority’s unexplained emphasis on what Justice Sotomayor calls merely “esthetic elements” of Lozman’s floating
structure, like “French doors” and “ordinary windows,” which have
“no relationship to maritime transport.”166 She suggests that if such
elements really are relevant under the “reasonable observer” test,
then the majority has not explained why they are relevant to the Section 3 inquiry, and is therefore essentially suggesting an “I know it
when I see it” standard.167 Her criticism of the majority’s multiple
references to the prima facie irrelevant “esthetic” elements of Lozman’s floating structure, as support for their application of the “reasonable observer” test, is consistent with my earlier criticisms as to
the uselessness and irrelevance of the photograph of the floating
structure included in the Appendix of the majority opinion.168
IV. THE “NORMALIZATION” OF ADMIRALTY LAW: A PRIMER
There has been considerable scholarly reaction to the Court’s
reasoning in Lozman, much of it critical, and discussion of the possible practical consequences of the case for various sectors of maritime commerce.169 As we have seen, the case is unusual in several
166

Id. at 751–752 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 751–52 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
168
See supra, Part III.A.
169
See, e.g., Stewart F. Peck & David B. Sharpe, What is a Vessel?: Implications for Marine Finance, Marine Insurance, and Admiralty Jurisdiction, 89 TUL.
L. REV. 1103, 1104–07 (2015); Daniel Faessler, Defining a Vessel in Admiralty:
“I Know It When I See It”, 26 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 248, 248 (2014); J. Neale
deGravelles, Uncertainty in Vessel Status After Lozman v. Riviera Beach, Florida: An Analysis and Review of Recent Developments, 14 LOY. MAR. L. J. 56, 73
(2014); Robertson & Sturley, supra note 63, at 394; Megan C. White, Comment,
Back in the Same Boat: Vessel Status after Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 7
CHARLESTON L. REV. 559, 601–03 (2013); Caroline E. Frilot, Comment, Crisis
Averted: The Supreme Court Rejects a Subjective Vessel Status Test in Lozman v.
City of Riviera Beach, Florida, 38 TUL. MAR. L.J. 215, 229–30 (2013); Kenneth
G. Engerrand, Vessel Status Reconsidered, 11 LOY. MAR. L. J. 213, 267–70
(2013); Lindsey C. Brock III, The Practical Effects of Lozman, 38 TUL. MAR. L.J.
89, 101–02 (2013); Kathryn Yankowski, Comment, Whatever Floats the “Reasonable Observer’s” Boat: An Examination of Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach,
Fla. and the Supreme Court’s Ruling That Floating Homes Are Not Vessels, 67
U. MIAMI L. REV. 975, 997 (2013); Raul J. Chacon Jr. & Adam T. Ferguson, All
That Floats is Not a Boat: The Supreme Court’s Lozman Decision Makes Waves
Impacting Multiple Areas of Law, TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Summer 2013, at 11; David
167
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respects: the dubious ex ante case for granting certiorari,170 the exceptional facts of the case (including the uniqueness of the floating
structure at issue) vis-à-vis the normal concerns of federal admiralty
law, the course of the oral argument,171 the Court’s fashioning a new
vessel status test completely independently of its own line of cases
extending back over a century,172 and the subsequent public, extrajudicial comments173 made about the case by the Chief Justice. My
aim in the remainder of the Article is to suggest that these aspects of
the case are best understood as indications of a trend towards the
Supreme Court transforming its role in its capacity as an admiralty
court, by abdicating its traditional and constitutionally mandated
duty to engage broadly in federal common lawmaking in admiralty.
The Court is increasingly showing a preference to see itself as
“sail[ing] in occupied waters,”174 that is, to allow Congress to take
the lead in creating substantive law in the area, and then to make law
only when necessary, to fill in gaps created by federal statute with
little regard for the long history of its cases being the primary source
of law in admiralty.175
According to some scholars who have developed sophisticated
views expressing familiar concerns about separation of powers and
federalism in relation to the Court’s traditional role in admiralty,176
these are welcome developments. In this section, I first summarize
these views, which suggest that federal admiralty law should be
“normalized” and treated like most other areas of federal law, with
respect to the scope of the lawmaking powers of the federal
courts.177 In the next section, I show that the otherwise inexplicable
aspects of Lozman which I have discussed, are explained by the
Court’s implicit preference for normalization and, moreover, that
R. Maass, Comment, If It Looks Like a Vessel: The Supreme Court’s “Reasonable
Observer” Test for Vessel Status, 65 FLA. L. REV. 905–06 (2013).
170
See Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 740.
171
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77 at *2, 5, 8.
172
See Lozman, 133 S. Ct. at 749.
173
See Chief Justice John Roberts Remarks, supra note 64.
174
Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990) (“We sail in occupied
waters. Maritime tort law is now dominated by federal statute, and we are not free
to expand remedies at will . . . .”).
175
See generally id. at 27,36–37.
176
See, e.g., The Last Brooding Omnipresence, supra note 3, at 1350.
177
See, e.g., It’s Just Water, supra note 11, at 480.
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the vices of Lozman reflect the corresponding vices of a normalization approach in admiralty cases. In that sense, while a general, systematic critique of normalization deserves its own independent discussion, Lozman nonetheless serves as a pragmatic argument
against normalization of admiralty. In this case, at least, the implementation of a normalization approach by the Court, an approach
which served as a set of background assumptions about the proper
method of judicial decision on the vessel status issue, lead to a number of independently undesirable results. Before elaborating further
on those, however, I first turn to the substantive arguments for the
normalization of federal admiralty law.
Over the last two decades, several federal courts scholars, and
especially Ernest Young in a series of articles, have argued that the
federal courts’ long-practiced federal common lawmaking powers
in admiralty, independent of Congressional action, are unconstitutional.178 The argument begins with, and largely rests on, a particular
understanding of the original constitutional grant.179 The central
claim is that both the Article III grant, extending the judicial power
to “all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,”180 along with
its statutory counterpart, the Judiciary Act of 1789, extending “original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction” on the federal district courts181 are merely jurisdictional
grants, and neither the Constitution nor the Judiciary Act make any
178
See, e.g., The Last Brooding Omnipresence, supra note 3, at 1357–58; see
also Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 291
(1999) [hereinafter Preemption at Sea]; It’s Just Water, supra note 11, at 476–77;
Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1639, 1655–67 (2008) [hereinafter Preemption and Federal Common Law].
Others have argued along broadly similar lines. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal
Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1341–60
(1996) (arguing that federal courts may not make federal common law regarding
private maritime claims); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal
Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 894–95 (1986) (arguing against most forms
of federal common law, including admiralty); Martin H. Redish, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 146–47 (2d ed.
1990) (arguing for the complete abolition of the “so-called ‘law of the sea’”) (citation omitted).
179
See Field, supra note 171, at 890–91.
180
U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2.
181
The Judiciary Act, ch. 20, 1 Stat. § 9 (1789) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1333 (2012)).

2017]

LOST AT SEA

977

reference to substantive lawmaking power.182 The federal courts’
power to make federal law in admiralty would therefore presumptively be subject to the same limitations on their power to make law
in other areas of federal law.
Those limitations were established in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, which held that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any
case is the law of the State . . . .There is no federal general common
law.”183 The result was what has been called the “new federal common law,”184 in which federal courts are empowered to make federal
common law in a very narrow range of cases: either in cases in
which doing so would protect a “uniquely federal interest,”185 or
those in which Congress has overtly or implicitly delegated to the
Court the authority to fill in the gaps of federal statutory schemes.186
The post-Erie world is therefore one in which, as Justice Holmes
famously remarked, “[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign. . . that
can be identified.”187 And, so the argument goes, from the point of
view of a sound federalism, this is just as it should be, since in the
courts’ most common task of interstitial lawmaking, “Congress has
made the primary legislative judgment in such cases and the states
are politically represented in that process.”188 The argument for the
normalization of admiralty law claims that this is precisely what is
lacking in the making of general federal common law in admiralty:
“In admiralty . . . courts generally make law wholly apart from any

182

See Preemption and Federal Common Law, supra note 171, at 1672–73.
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), overruling Swift v.
Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1842) (holding that, absent an applicable state statute,
the federal courts were free to develop general federal commercial law sitting in
diversity jurisdiction).
184
See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 421– 22 (1964).
185
See Tex. Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (citing
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964)).
186
See D’Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447,
470 (1942).
187
S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
188
The Last Brooding Omnipresence, supra note 3, at 1353.
183
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federal statute, and the separation of powers and federalism problems [of Congressional guidance and state representation] become
more compelling.”189
It is ironic, but not coincidental, that when Justice Holmes railed
against the “brooding omnipresence” of federal common law,190 he
was writing on the losing side of an admiralty case decided twentyone years before Erie, Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen,191 in which the
Court held that federal general maritime law, i.e., law made by the
Court independently of Congress, pre-empted state legislation on
the grounds that:
[N]o such legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress or
works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with
the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its
international and interstate relations.192
Thus, Jensen sets out a strong, and clear, default rule of maritime
pre-emption according to which judicially-made federal maritime
law (in the language of Jensen, “the general maritime law”) will
standardly pre-empt state law, regardless of whether it is statutory
or common law.193 Jensen remains good law,194 and subsequently,
the Court stressed the irrelevance of the Erie doctrine in the realm
of admiralty law.195
189

Id.
Jensen, 244 U.S. at 222 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
191
Id. at 205.
192
Id. at 216.
193
See id.
194
See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447 n.1 (1994) (“[W]e think
it inappropriate to overrule Jensen in dictum, and without argument or even invitation.”).
195
See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 410–11 (1953) (holding
that general maritime law, and not state common law, governed a maritime tort
claim, regardless of whether the case was brought in admiralty, diversity, or some
other basis). See also Joel K. Goldstein, Federal Common Law in Admiralty: An
Introduction to the Beginning of an Exchange, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1337, 1344
(1999) (noting some scholars have summarized the Court’s position in Pope as
“the Erie limitation [does] not apply at sea.”); Theodore F. Stevens, Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins and the Uniform General Maritime Law, 64 HARV. L. REV. 246, 270
(1950) (internal citations omitted):
190
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However, according to the argument for the normalization of admiralty law, since the legitimacy of the Court’s reasoning in Jensen
rests on a number of dubious assumptions, Jensen was wrongly decided and is therefore unconstitutional.196 Examination of the
originalist arguments regarding the fundamental purpose of the Article III admiralty grant shows that the Framers primarily had in
mind certain categories of (now rare) public law cases, such as prize
and capture cases and piracy, and though they almost certainly were
aware that the grant would cover private maritime claims,197 this
falls far short of the view that the Court is vested with the power to
make substantive admiralty rules independent of Congress, much
less establishes the strong pre-emption principle of Jensen.198 Moreover, on an originalist understanding of the general maritime law in
the Founding era, it was derived from the law of nations and so not
properly characterized as either state or federal law.199 From this

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins rests solely upon the principle that state
courts should have the power to determine the scope and effectiveness of rights created by the states in the exercise of their
Constitutional powers. Similarly, admiralty courts, through the
federal judicial power conferred by the Constitution, have
adopted or created a certain body of legal principles, which, regardless of their source, must be uniformly applied. It may be
that this is merely another form of ‘federal common law’ masquerading under a title of the general maritime law. If this is
true, so long as a state will provide a jurisdiction in which its
residents may seek a common law remedy, it becomes even
more apparent that federal diversity courts are not bound by
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins on maritime issues.
Stevens was writing before Pope was decided.
196
See The Last Brooding Omnipresence, supra note 3, at 1362. This may be
overstating the strength of Young’s conclusion, for one way to read his argument
suggests that Jensen is simply out of step with the modern rule allowing the
preemption of state law by federal statute (Id. at 1356). However, the subsequent
historical argument (Id. at 1357–63) he makes implies that Jensen, when decided,
relied on a number of illicit historical fictions. See id.
197
See Jonathan M. Guthoff, Admiralty, Article III, and Supreme Court Review of State-Court Decisionmaking, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2169, 2178 n.25 (1996).
198
See The Last Brooding Omnipresence, supra note 3, at 1358–60.
199
See id. at 1360.
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perspective, the significance of Jensen is that it “essentially federalized the general maritime law[.]”200 But if so, then the original Article III grant, or the 1789 Judiciary Act, cannot be read as implicit
delegations of federal lawmaking authority to the federal courts.201
Finally, in regards to Jensen’s explicit call for uniformity “in its international and interstate relations[,]”202 coupled with the implied
assumption that the Supreme Court is best suited to create and maintain that uniformity, the reply in favor of normalization is that worries about uniformity are overstated in admiralty and are no more
serious than in other areas of federal law, particularly those that have
some connection to foreign affairs, and federal statutes have proven
to be means just as effective in bringing about the desired degree of
uniformity.203
The argument for normalization has several other twists and
turns which, for present purposes, need not detain us. Young usefully encapsulates the normalization approach this way:
Judge-made federal common law is legitimate because of—and only to the extent of—its connection
to democratic enactments; most of the general maritime law’s applications, however, cannot meet this
standard. Preemption by judge-made law is even
more problematic than simple common lawmaking;
given our system’s primary reliance on Congress as
the protector of state regulatory prerogatives,
preemption is extremely difficult to justify in the absence of legislative action.204
V. LOST AT SEA: LOZMAN AND THE VICES OF NORMALIZATION
The argument that admiralty law should be “normalized” vis-àvis other areas of federal law is clearly complex and turns out to
include a number of interdependent claims regarding the legitimacy

200
201
202
203
204

It’s Just Water, supra note 11, at 485.
See id.
S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
See Preemption at Sea, supra note 171, at 305–06.
Id. at 277 (emphasis in original).
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or illegitimacy of federal common lawmaking powers of the Supreme Court,205 the extent to which federal common law in admiralty should displace state law,206 and the proper understanding of
the relation between the general maritime law and federal admiralty
statutes, among others.207 The case for the normalization of admiralty is a powerful one, but I believe it is ultimately mistaken in several fundamental aspects. A comprehensive critique of it, however,
will have to wait for another occasion.208 I have introduced the normalization argument because it is an illuminating lens through
which to view the oddities of Lozman. The case, in turn, helps illuminate why normalizing admiralty law, whether or not justified by
concerns of federalism and separation of powers, is pragmatically
objectionable, since it tends to produce bad outcomes (along a number of familiar metrics, such as certainty, clarity, and predictability)
when the Court adopts the tenets of normalization as part of its judicial methodology in admiralty cases.209
First, and most importantly, the implicit adoption of the normalization approach by the Court explains its overwhelming focus in
Lozman, throughout both the oral argument and the majority’s opinion, on 1 U.S.C. §3, the only Congressional enactment of relevance
in the case. It also explains the corresponding scant attention the
Court paid to its own line of vessel status cases, which extends back
to the nineteenth century,210 indeed a line of cases older than the
1873 Section 3 statutory definition.211 The implicit acceptance of a
normalization approach also explains the lack of attention given in
205
See id. at 281. See also David J. Sharpe, Admiralty Jurisdiction: The Power
Over Cases, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1149, 1160–61 (2005).
206
See id. at 305–06.
207
See id. at 318.
208
Suffice it to say the view has attracted a fair amount of critical discussion.
See David W. Denton, Jr., Lifting “The Great Shroud of the Sea”: A Customary
International Law Approach to the Domestic Application of Maritime Law, 37
TUL. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2012); Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 617–19 (2006); Sharpe, supra note
205, at 1160–61; Louise Weinberg, Back to the Future: The New General Common Law, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 523, 535–38 (2004); Jonathan M. Gutoff, Federal
Common Law and Congressional Delegation: A Reconceptualization of Admiralty, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 367, 375–86 (2000).
209
See generally Gutoff, supra note 193, at 379–84.
210
See, e.g., Crapo v. Kelly, 83 U.S. 610, 631–32 (1872).
211
See, e.g., Greeley v. U.S., 21 U.S. 257, 257 (1823).
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the case to the general purposes of a definition of “vessel” in the
broader context of federal admiralty law (whether that law is statutory or judge-made), in particular to the fact that a vessel status test
is only one among many used to determine admiralty jurisdiction in
a given case, whether the test is otherwise provided by statute,212 or
is a test which has been developed by the Court independently of
Congress.213 This myopic exercise in statutory construction makes
sense only on the presumption that the limits of the Court’s common
lawmaking powers are determined by prior Congressional action,
which is precisely one of the core claims in the argument for normalization.214
Second, a presumption in favor of normalizing admiralty would
begin to explain why the Court granted certiorari on Lozman in the
first place. Despite the many compelling reasons there were against
the Supreme Court taking the case,215 if the Court viewed its role ex
ante as resolving an intra-circuit conflict centered only on the interpretation of a definition provided by a federal statute, then the
uniqueness of Lozman’s floating structure would rather count in favor of, and not against, the granting of certiorari. Merely interpreting
a statute invited the court to play “the law school game,” as Justice
212

See, e.g., Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a) (2012) (extending admiralty jurisdiction to “cases of injury or damage, to person or property,
caused by a vessel on navigable waters, even though the injury or damage is done
or consummated on land.”)
213
See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S.
527, 534 (1995) (holding that a tort must occur on navigable waters for admiralty
tort jurisdiction, which requires that the incident could have “a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce” and that the “general character” of the “activity giving rise to the incident” shows a “substantial relationship to traditional
maritime activity.”) (citations omitted).
214
See Chief Justice Roberts Remarks, supra note 64. These remarks by Chief
Justice Robert’s involve another non-admiralty case decided in the same (2012–
2013) term as Lozman and regarded the proper role of the federal judiciary in
regard to the constitutionality of same sex marriage. See Hollingsworth v. Perry,
133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (“Federal courts have authority under the Constitution to answer such questions only if necessary to do so in the course of deciding
an actual ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ . . . .This is an essential limit on our power: It
ensures that we act as judges, and do not engage in policymaking properly left to
elected representatives.”) (emphasis in original). While itself a fairly standard
conservative call for judicial restraint, it also aptly characterizes the Court’s approach in deciding Lozman.
215
See supra Part II.
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Kennedy called it,216 and, as we have seen, that game requires imagining far-fetched and often absurd examples to test the appropriateness of a definition; in fact, the more far-fetched, the better. The
novelty of Lozman’s floating structure gave the court an actual farfetched case to consider. Therefore, the otherwise irrelevant “floating home” in controversy facilitated, rather than hindered, the quasiSocratic, definitional “game” of throwing up for consideration imaginary examples and counter-examples.
Third, the apparent levity with which the Court decided the case
can also be explained by an implicit adoption of the strategy of normalization of admiralty law. In so far as the Court was taking up a
normalizing role in Lozman, and mostly setting aside its earlier
cases, as well as a comprehensive approach to protecting maritime
commerce, it would make sense that Chief Justice Roberts would
characterize the case as one of the Court’s “littler” ones. The task of
interpreting a single word in a statute is admittedly a more modest
one as compared to a case within a complex statutory environment
(e.g., at the intersection of immigration and criminal law),217 or a
case involving a controversial political issue (e.g., same-sex marriage).218
And yet, just as the Court’s implicit commitment to normalizing
admiralty provides useful context for understanding Lozman, its
many objectionable aspects are likewise attributable to it being a decisive step in the direction of normalization. The case in fact demonstrates the pragmatic difficulties, and troublesome consequences, of
attempting to make admiralty “normal” in relation to the rest of federal law and the Court’s powers in shaping it. The normalization
project amounts to the Court abandoning its traditional and constitutionally mandated duty under Article III to fashion rules and principles of decision for maritime disputes. These judicially-crafted
rules and principles have been reasonably stable and consistent for

216

See Transcript, supra note 65, at 8.
See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1686–87 (2013) (holding
that a non-citizens arrest for intent to distribute marijuana was not for an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act).
218
See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2663, 2667–68 (holding the Petitioner did
not have standing to appeal ruling in lower court on the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8, a referendum on same-sex marriage).
217
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decades, in many cases for centuries, and normalization has the potential to profoundly disrupt that stability. In Lozman, as the latest
example of a dramatic escalation in normalizing admiralty, that potential became a reality, and with undesirable consequences. The result of implicitly endorsing normalization in the case was an unpredictable and blind act of deference to federal statute, which then
made it possible for the Court to engage in irrelevant reasoning over
a range of trivial and absurd examples. That reasoning then produced an unprecedented, ex nihilo test for vessel status, a test which
provides little guidance to lower courts, and one which will continue
to confound those in the private sectors which make up the vital national and international economy of maritime trade.
An advocate for normalizing admiralty may respond that a pragmatic argument against it, even if valid on its own terms, is surely
outweighed by the more entrenched values of safeguarding federalism and maintaining separation of powers:
While pragmatic concerns enter into constitutional
law in a number of contexts, the fact that a particular
legal regime is more efficient or represents better
policy will rarely save an otherwise unconstitutional
law. The Constitution frequently chooses other values—such as democracy, decentralization, and
checks and balances—over efficiency, and nowhere
is this more accurate than in the fields of federalism
and separation of powers.219
The response to this argument is that what is at stake in Lozman
is not merely increased efficiency. The concerns motivating this Article’s criticisms regarding how the Court handled the case, from
beginning to end, lie elsewhere. The examination of Lozman reveals
a failure of the Court to rise to the occasion of reasonably granting
certiorari and reviewing cases with the requisite amount of seriousness. The case also demonstrates a failure in providing certainty and
regularity for all those parties frequently subject to the admiralty law
of the United States. These latter concerns of certainty and regularity
are at least as deeply rooted in the American legal tradition as are
the values of federalism and separation of powers. Certainty and
219

The Last Brooding Omnipresence, supra note 3, at 1362.
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regularity are both traditional core components of the ideal of the
rule of law, surely a political value which advocates on either side
of the normalization debate, and across the political spectrum, can
embrace.220 For the Court to abruptly shift to a normalization approach in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century is to risk
compromising certainty and regularity on each and every occasion
in which it acts in its unique capacity as the American High Court
of Admiralty. The long-term benefits of such a shift (if indeed there
are any) are not yet clear; in any case, the principled constitutional
arguments for normalization have not yet taken account of the worries expressed here regarding the upholding of rule of law values, as
well as the Court exercising a requisite amount of seriousness and
propriety in reviewing admiralty cases.
CONCLUSION
The kinds of complaints made in this Article about the apparent
efforts of the Supreme Court to “normalize” federal admiralty law,
on full display in Lozman, are not unprecedented. A quarter century
ago, Judge John R. Brown anticipated the dangers of the Court implementing a process of normalization in admiralty. In criticizing
the Court’s reasoning in Miles v. Apex,221 he identified the erosion
of not only the technical expertise of our only national admiralty
court, but also the increasing tendency for the Court to essentially
abdicate its Article III responsibility to develop and maintain a coherent body of federal law to govern maritime disputes, and instead
to let Congress take the lead.222 As we have seen in the Lozman case,
220

See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 208–09
(1960) (discussing how predictability in law promotes individual liberty by protecting a sphere of unimpeded private action); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 207 (Rev. ed. 1999) (discussing the rule of law as requiring the regular
and impartial application of public rules).
221
498 U.S. 19, 21 (1990).
222
See Brown, supra note 7, at 282:
The decision of the Supreme Court to bar recovery of nonpecuniary damages in an unseaworthiness claim under the general
maritime law, based on the olds statute providing a negligence
remedy which was enacted under Congress’ power to regulate
commerce, leads to the most strained preemption holding ever
reached by an American admiralty judge. In essence, the implied effect of the implied provision in a statute enacted under

986

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:938

that tendency has become even more pronounced and with problematic results.
The current prevailing political and ideological orientation of the
Court is likely to change significantly during the Trump administration, and it remains to be seen the consequences of those changes
for the future of federal admiralty law. Those changes will determine whether the Court will continue to unjustifiably narrow its own
power with respect to the Article III grant of admiralty jurisdiction,
or whether it will return to its traditional and constitutionally prescribed role of making rules of decision in admiralty in the manner
of a common law court.223 If the Court opts for the former alternative, and continues in the trend of normalization, there are likely
rough waters ahead.

an implied power of Congress served to eliminate a remedy declared by the admiralty judges of the Supreme Court in exercise
of their power conferred directly by Constitution.
(emphasis in original). See also Joel K. Goldstein, The Life and Times of Wilburn
Boat: A Critical Guide (Part II), 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 555, 590 (1997) (noting
the Supreme Court’s “recent retreat from its role of expositor of general maritime
law.”).
223
See Young, supra note 3, at 1360–61.

